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Abstract: There has been a long history of coal mine accidents and these, usually, involve serious 
injuries, fatalities, and the destruction of facilities. In the seventies, an explosion killed 28 miners in 
a Spanish coal mine. This paper gives insight into the main factors of the accident by means of the 
causation mode, using two well-known alternatives: (1) the method from the Spanish Instituto 
Nacional de Seguridad y Salud en el Trabajo (INSST), where the causes and circumstances of the 
accident are classified into immediate causes and basic causes, and (2) the Feyer and Williamson 
method, where the classification is done using precursor events and contributing factors. The 
analysis identifies the lessons to be learned from the disaster. Both methods have given very similar 
results, verifying the goodness of the analysis. Methane emissions due to a variation in the 
exploitation method, the electrical installation, and a lack of safety procedures and training were 
the main causes of the accident. These findings explain the real causes of this accident and can be 
very valuable for the prevention of future accidents. 
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1. Introduction 
Safety issues are a subject of great concern in the mining industry [1–4], with proposals of new 
approaches to achieve better explanations and predict and prevent workplace accidents [5,6]. Coal 
mining is one of the most dangerous types of mining within the sector [7,8], and many studies have 
been done to understand the main causes of hazards such as coal dust explosiveness or methane [9–
15]. 
Coal mining has suffered many fatalities over the last century despite the obvious advances in 
technology [16,17]. The vast majority of this type of accidents are related to explosions and 
deflagrations due to poor ventilation and inadequate conditions or exploitation method. Mine 
explosions, whether of methane or coal dust, and spontaneous methane emissions are the most 
common causes of high fatalities in coal mining accidents [18–21]. Besides, several studies have 
revealed that some factors such as environmental conditions with a significant presence of dust, 
humidity, and falling rocks can act as precursor agents to accidents in underground mining, 
increasing the incidence and severity of accidents [22–26]. Hence, it is important for the stakeholders 
involved in the industry to have the proper tools, frameworks, and understanding of the hazards to 
deal with accident causation and to achieve a proper safety system [7,27]. 
As in other historical accidents that have been restudied after many years [28,29], this research 
is focused on analyzing an explosion that occurred in a coal mine that caused the death of 28 miners. 
Initial information suggested the accident suffered in the case study was produced because of an 
inadequate exploitation method, but some points still remained unclear. For this reason, we have 
used two analysis methods to explain and verify the events, which were unknown when the accident 
occurred [30–33]. Interviews have also been carried out in order to obtain additional information. The 
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aim of the study is to clarify the main factors of the accident by means of two well-known 
methodologies, as well as highlight the main differences and similarities between them. 
2. Case Study  
2.1. Exploitation Method  
The mine seams were between 11° and 15° north and mining was taking place in depths between 
525 and 707 meters. The exploitation method used at that moment was a classic longwall system, with 
panels of approximately 250 meters width, a slope between 12°–15° and two main drifts with a difference 
in level of around 50 meters. A mechanical shearer with a self-advancing hydraulically powered supports 
was implemented about one month before the accident, changing from the old support and extraction 
method, manual drilling, and wooden frames. A conveyor belt system was used to carry out the coal 
through a ramp. The mine was equipped with two main fans and then the airflow was conducted to 
the different workshops by means of forcing auxiliary fans. Initially, the changes in the exploitation 
method were thought to be the only responsible of the accident. 
2.2. Methane Characteristics 
An atmosphere containing between 5% and 15% methane and over 12% oxygen can be an 
explosive mixture. The temperature required to ignite an explosive methane-air mixture is 
approximately 540 °C, being easily ignited by an electrical arc, frictional spark, heated surface, or 
open flame. The amount of energy necessary for ignition will vary with gas concentration; however, 
as little as 0.3 millijoules (mJ) of electrical energy is required. Roof falls can ignite explosive methane–
air mixtures either by generating frictional heat or by releasing piezoelectric energy [16]. 
Besides, high concentrations of gas in the goaf and adjacent layers can pour into the workings 
as the air pressure in different parts of the underground mine is imbalanced [34]. Despite the fact that 
the gas emission zone can be estimated globally using various methods or assumptions, it is not 
uncommon that predictions may be under or overestimated due to the lack of sufficient spatial 
information defining the quantity and location of the gas sources in the overlying strata [35]. 
According to Spanish legislation, in the moment of the accident, methane emission measures 
done in the panel of the accident were considered as very low, 1.4 m3/ton. However, methane 
measures were taken three days after the accident without ventilation and concentrations of 5% of 
methane were measured, which was the maximum level of measurement for the type of 
methanometer used.  
Originally, it was thought that the source of such amount of methane was some fractures in the 
coal seam. Subsequently, a set of measures was done to determine its behavior. Table 1 gathers the 
measures done in the most adverse points of the roof after the accident, Point A and Point B from 
Figure 1, switching off the ventilation system. 
Table 1. Methane proportion (%). 
Time Ventilation Point A Point B 
07:30 Switched on 0.0 0.0 
07:40 Switched off 0.0 0.0 
07:45 Switched off 0.2 0.0 
08:00 Switched off 0.35 0.0 
08:15 Switched off 0.4 0.2 
08:30 Switched off 0.5 0.2 
08:50 Switched off 0.7 0.7 
09:00 Switched off 0.8 1.5 
09:15 Switched off 0.8 3.5 
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 3615 3 of 11 
 
09:40 Switched off 1.0 Higher than 5 
09:45 Switched on 1.0 Higher than 5 
09:47 Switched on 1.0 0.2 
09:48 Switched on 1.0 0.0 
Values from Table 1 exposes that: (a) Methane concentration was very low within the normal 
functioning of the auxiliary fan, and (b) there was a constant increase of methane concentration once 
the fan was switched off until high values were above the capacity of the methanometer. The values 
suggest that methane ascends to the inlet due to very low natural ventilation, in the opposite direction 
of the artificial ventilation. 
2.3. Accident Details 
The accident occurred due to a very strong explosion. The first shift entered to the mine at 8:00 
am and the accident was at 9:00 am. 28 miners died in the Working Face 09, Figure 1, where number 1 
is the entry of the workshop and number 2 is the exit. This workshop had a length of 224 meters with 
a seam between 1.5–1.8 meters and a slope of around 11°. Figure 2 shows the characteristics details 
of the workshop. 
 
Figure 1. Workshop where the accident occurred. Point 1 and 2 are entry and exist of the working 
face, respectively, while point A and B are the measuring points. 
A B 
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Figure 2. Detailed scheme of the workshop. 
The inspection of the accident concluded that it started in the first third of the panel and the 
expansion was in both directions, to Drift-09 and Cementos-07. However, the shock wave was diluted 
in the lower part of the panel, Drift-09. The medical survey pointed out that the death had been 
immediate due to severe burn injuries with a low quantity of toxic gases or mechanical effects. 
3. Methodology 
The causation models are often used to explain accidents, either in the mining industry or in 
other sectors [36,37]. The cause diagram analysis is a widespread system to determine the basic and 
immediate causes of an accident or incident by means of simply organizing the factors collected in 
situ. This paper analyses the causes and explains the origin of the accident. Government reports and 
interviews with the technical staff, miners, and doctors have been used to support it, as well as 
measurements done in the mine after the accident. The method chosen in this case study has been 
used in many other similar investigations, such as for [29,30], because of its appropriateness in 
considering the sequence of events leading to the accident. 
The accident investigation is based on the Instituto Nacional de Seguridad y Salud en el Trabajo 
(INSST) method [30,31] and the Feyer and Williamson method [32,33]. 
The INSST method exposes a classification of the two different causes: Immediate and basic. 
Immediate causes are the circumstances that occur just before the accident and they are usually 
divided in unsafe acts (UA) and unsafe conditions (UC), depending on whether the indicated 
circumstances are due to the behavior of the workers or workplace bad conditions. Therefore, unsafe 
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acts are mainly attributable to workers, while unsafe conditions are usually attributable to managers, 
work equipment, or lack of procedures, among others. The basic causes are the reason because unsafe 
acts and conditions happen and they are usually organizational failures that facilitate immediate 
cause such as technical and behavioral failures. These basic causes can be classified in personal factors 
(PF) or workplace factors (WF), which cause unsafe acts and unsafe conditions, respectively. 
On the other hand, the Feyer and Williamson method (Figure 3) allow determining up to three 
events that preceded the accident, called precedent events, and are crucial for the accident occurrence. 
These are called Precursor Events (abbreviated to PE1, PE2, and PE3). Each of these events could be 
classified in one of four possible ways: 
• E1. Environmental events (EE): Events or conditions resulting from the location of the accident 
(e.g., low lighting, wet floor, or cramped conditions). 
• E2. Equipment events (EQ): Events resulting from breakage or malfunction of machinery or tools. 
• E3. Behavioural events (BE): Events resulting directly from human involvement (e.g., leaning too 
far into the path of machinery, touching an electrically charged object). 
• E4. Medical events (ME): Events resulting from the person’s current state of physical well-being 
(e.g., heart attack or diabetic or epileptic episode). 
Behavioral events, E3, are coded further into whether they constitute an error or not (i.e., the 
incorrect performance of standard operating procedure). Errors are sorted in two well-known 
classification systems. The first coded error into omissions (things not done) or commissions (things 
done incorrectly). The second one into skill-based errors (routine behavior), rule-based errors 
(involving the application of learned rules) and knowledge-based errors (troubleshooting). 
Besides, the Feyer and Williamson method allows identifying contributing factors that were 
crucial for the sequence of the accident consisting of 1, 2, or 3 events. If any of the events did not 
happen, the accident would not occur. However, the contributing factors alone are not enough for 
the accident occurrence. It is also important to note that the contributing factors largely coincide with 
the basic or main causes of the INSST method. 
 
Figure 3. Elements that compose the Feyer and Williamson method. PE1, PE2, and PE3 are Precursor 
Events. 
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The nature of contributing factors (CF) was also coded into eight possible categories: 
• CF1. Environmental (E): Factors resulting from conditions occurring at an earlier time at the 
location of the accident. 
• CF2. Equipment (EQ): Factors associated with the design or upkeep of machinery, tools, personal 
protective equipment, or safety equipment. 
• CF3. Work practice (WP): Factors involving risky standard operating procedures accepted by 
management and/or personnel (including categories of poor upkeep or misuse of equipment). 
• CF4. Supervision (S): Factors relating to inadequate charge of workers. 
• CF5. Training (T): Factors relating to inadequate training of workers. 
• CF6. Task error (TE): Factors relating to incorrect performance of duty. 
• CF7. Medical (M): Factors involving physical well-being at an earlier time. 
• CF8. Other (O): Factors such as alcohol/drug involvement, delays in reaching medical attention, 
and social aspects. 
4. Results 
4.1. INSST Method 
The nomenclature followed is described in the INSST method [30]. IC means immediate cause; 
BC means basic cause; Fxx means type of fatality; Dxx deviation; UAxx unsafe act; UCxx unsafe 
condition; PFxx personal factor, and WFxx work factor. All these elements are included in the INSST 
method [30,31].  
4.1.1. Immediate Causes 
A conjunction of two unsafe conditions and one unsafe act were identified in the root of the 
accident: 
- UC1: Inadequate protection or safety guard in the electrical equipment for an explosive 
atmosphere at the moment it was switched on. The data collected after the accident suggested 
that a spark in the electrical light system of the head drift got in contact with a coal bed methane 
due to the lack of electrical protection against explosions. The event happened before the 
ventilation system was able to dilute the methane concentration in the roof the drift. 
- UA3: Incorrect control, done by the watchman at the beginning of the shift after a production 
break. There is no record of controlling the working faces before the shift restarted working and 
switched on all the equipment. 
- UC6: Danger of fire or explosion due to an explosive mixture in the drift. 
4.1.2. Basic Causes 
- The unsafe act UA3, previously stated, was produced because of a lack of knowledge/training of 
the watchman, who did not know that a safety protocol to find coal bed methane in the drifts had 
to be applied before the entry of the workforce and initiation of the installation. The mining 
company did not provide any procedure, documentation, or training in this regard. This fact is a 
basic cause in the second level of the event sequence, lack of knowledge of the employee (PF2). 
- A combination of two basic causes, also in the second level of the event sequence, resulted in an 
unsafe condition in the first level (UC1): 
o WF1: Insufficient leading and supervision, due to the mine not being properly classified 
with regard to the danger of gas emissions. 
o WF4: Inadequate maintenance of the installation and/or equipment due to a lack of 
control of the electrical equipment, which was not appropriate for a coal mine. 
- Another combination of two basic causes in the second level of the event sequence gave a first 
level of unsafe condition (UC6): 
o WF6: Poor work procedures. The company did not have any procedure before switching 
on the installation once the ventilation system had been stopped. 
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o WF1: Leadership and lack of supervision. The staff of the mine did not take into account 
the increase of the methane emission caused by the change of the production method 23 
days before the accident. More productivity gave more release of methane. 
Figure 4 summarizes the accident by means of a causal tree using the INSST method. The specific 
conditions of the accident are also detailed below. 
- F13: Type of accident by contact with direct flames or objects/environments with high 
temperature or in flames. 
- F41: Type of accident by collision or blow against an object or fragments—projected. 
- D13: Deviation or anomalous event due to an explosion. 
- UA3: Unsafe act due to carry out anything without proper insurance. 
- UC1: Unsafe condition due to the usage of one or more inadequate protections and guards. 
- UC6: Unsafe condition due to there is a danger of explosion or fire. 
- PF2: Personal factor due to a lack of knowledge. 
- WF1: Work factor due to an insufficient leadership and supervision. 
- WF4: Work factor due to an inadequate maintenance. 
- WF6: Poor labor rules. 
 
Figure 4. Causal tree using the Spanish Instituto Nacional de Seguridad y Salud en el Trabajo (INSST) 
method. 
4.2. Feyer and Williamson Method 
4.2.1. Previous Events 
Three events have been identified in this accident analysis: PE1, PE2, and PE3, see Figure 5. PE1 
happened before the accident, environmental event (EE), and it took place because of the coal bead 
methane in some irregularities in the roof of the drift. All the evidences point out that this 
accumulation of explosive gas was caused by: 
(a) The ventilation system being switched off for several hours. Subsequently, it was initiated again 
without following any safety protocol to dilute the methane accumulations. 
(b) The new exploitation method which started 23 days before the accident. The staff of the mine did 
not consider any possible change in the methane emission rate because of that. 
The PE2 event is related to equipment (EQ), a spark was produced in the electrical installation 
that powered the light of the drifts a few minutes after the system was switched on due to a lack of 
protections against an explosive environment. This fact is attributable to: 
a) An incorrect hazard level of the coal mine according to the law at the time of the accident, which 
was classified as a much less dangerous mine. 
b) The inadequate maintenance of the electrical system. 
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On the other hand, PE3 is a behavior event (BE) and it was caused by a lack of knowledge of the 
watchman about the safety procedure needed to follow after the ventilation system had been 
switched off, verification of the methane levels in the drifts before the workforce enter to the mine, 
and the equipment is restarted. The company could not certify any type of training or safety protocol. 
4.2.2. Contributing Factors 
Two contributing factors have been identified (Figure 5) as crucial in the occurrence of the 
accident. 
- Unsafe procedures, CF3, attributed to the work practice (WP) on safety staff of the company. The 
data collected suggests that there was a lack of internal safety procedures or protocols after a long 
period without ventilation in a workshop or underground area. If the ventilation system had 
been working previously or the watchman had properly controlled the methane concentrations 
in the drifts, the accidents would not have happened. It is considered the most important causal 
factor. 
- Incorrect supervision (S), CF4, by the mine staff. The potential changes in the health and safety 
conditions were not considered after the exploitation method variation, extracting more coal per 
hour and, therefore, emitting more methane to the drifts. The change to a more dangerous coal 
mine class would have been translated to more restrictive procedures in terms of safety and 
according to the legislation of the time. It is considered a less important factor than the previous 
one. 
 
Figure 5. Causal tree using the Feyer and Williamson method. 
5. Discussion 
Both methods point out the same cause of the accident in spite of the different organization and 
ways of sorting it. The Feyer and Williamson classify the causes of the accident in essential events 
and contributing factors, both of them necessary for the chain or sequence of events in the accident.  
On the other hand, the INSST method classifies the causes in immediate causes, directly related 
to the accident occurrence, and basic causes, which have a strong influence in the realization of the 
immediate causes. These immediate causes are the equivalent to the Feyer and Williamson, most of 
the time, while the base causes correspond to the contributing factors. 
One of the main differences found during the analysis is the number of essential events for the 
occurrence of the accident. The INSST can use all the events found, while the Feyer and Williamson 
method used only three due to that fact that it is a method that digitalizes any type of accident and 
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then extracts global conclusions and trends. This last characteristic is very important to obtain global 
conclusions from the causes and workplaces where the accident took place. 
Another different characteristic is the sequence of the events. The three events of the Feyer and 
Williamson method are temporally sorted: PE1 before the accident, PE2 before PE1, and PE3 before 
PE2. While the INSST the causes are sorted by levels, not by a temporal order. In each level, several 
groups of causes are linked to the accident or other more recent causes from the accident. Figure 4 
has two grouping levels: (a) the first level is formed by three immediate causes—the accident could 
only happen with the combination of the three causes; (b) the second level is formed by four basic 
causes—the immediate causes UC1 and UC6 were developed by a combination of two basic causes, WF1 
+ WF4 and WF1 + WF6, respectively. 
Further research should be conducted to digitalize the INSST method and create a database of 
the accidents analyzed. In this regard, the immediate and basic causes codes should be thoroughly 
defined, including much more of them. The digitalization of the method would allow deeper 
assessments and the implementation of better preventive measures.  
On the other hand, sometimes is difficult to discriminate between and event or a contributing 
factor in the Feyer and Williamson method. Besides, it can also be difficult to determine the 
temporary position of the events. More case studies should be analyzed using the method to avoid 
possible misinterpretations. 
The possibility to create cause diagrams using data from accidents assessed by means of 
different methodologies would be another important tool to fully understand the accidents and verify 
the goodness of the accident analysis. 
6. Conclusions  
The main causes of this coal mine accident have been found by means of two contrasted 
methods, the Feyer and Williamson method and the INSST method, suggesting that the preventive 
structure and organization was the root of the accident. This conclusion was reached after gathering 
all the information available and applying an analysis procedure that did not exist at the moment of 
the accident.  
One of the main advantages of using a diagram analysis, either the Feyer and Williamson or the 
INSST, is that it gives a better picture of the accident events, providing a very useful tool to fully 
understand it. 
Despite the current legislation, technology, and working conditions being very different from 
1975, the mistakes that took place have a similar pattern when it is compared with other fatalities 
nowadays. Besides, organizational failures that lead to inadequate equipment, working standards, or 
workplace conditions are still found as important elements in accidents. This knowledge provides a 
valuable information in order to help the mining industry to prevent future accidents. 
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